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Abstract 
This paper proposes a matching model to build resilient and robust systems. Current systems require huge amounts of information that 
may not be available in a disaster situation. Also, many systems depend on solutions finely tuned under the assumption that information is 
available. We propose a matching model based on matching problems such as the stable marriage problem and the roommate problem. 
The matching model allows us to include the preferences of agents and other qualitatively different viewpoints in advance. It provides a 
natural way of diversifying solutions based on stable matching and will exhibit resilience when one solution ceases to be optimal or even 
to be feasible. An example application of evacuation route assignment (as opposed to optimal route search) with multiple starting points 
to a target point (a shelter) is used. 
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1. Introduction 
After major natural disasters, infrastructure such as roads, railways and communication networks are often severely 
damaged, and as a result, information may no longer be available or may be highly unreliable.  
Engineering and science in ordinary times are finely tuned for efficiency and assume that the necessary information is 
available, but this may not be true in a disaster situation. Engineering and science are needed to build and maintain robust 
and resilient systems that may not be optimally efficient in ordinary times but that can recover themselves even after a 
natural disaster. For example, such systems could work at 70 percent efficiency (assuming the theoretical upper bound of 
performance is 100 percent) in ordinary times and 50 percent in a disaster situation, rather than at 90 percent in ordinary 
times but 10 percent in a disaster situation. 
 
 
Nomenclature 
wjmiR ,  a rank of mi to wj, 1 when first preferred and N when last preferred where N is the size of the SMP 
²k(mi)  the kth preferred woman of man mi <k(mi)  an ordered set {²1(mi), ²2(mi), …, ²k(mi)} 
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If natural disasters are regarded as a two-player game between nature and humans, the game is asymmetric in the sense 
that humans always take the next move rather than nature; that humans are always on the defense side and nature is on the 
offense side, and most importantly humans do not have information about the adversary until it strikes. Since natural 
disasters such as earthquakes cannot be predicted, humans need to prepare every possible defense measure to minimize the 
damage in the worst case. In this sense, disaster reduction is a minimax strategy regarding the decisions and actions of the 
defense side. Disaster prevention, on the other hand, targets a specific disaster to be prevented and assumes specific 
information about the situation of the disaster in order to function efficiently.  
In ordinary times without a natural disaster, humans take the first move and are on the offense side, and can exploit 
natural resources. For ordinary times, one solution optimized for an invariant environment will suffice. When a disaster 
occurs, however, the solution optimized for ordinary times is no longer optimal and may not even be feasible. Therefore, we 
need to prepare diverse solutions which may not be optimal for ordinary times; diverse solutions are required in this 
asymmetric game rather than a single solution optimized for a single unstable situation. As a possible approach to preparing 
diverse and stable solutions, we propose a matching model based on matching problems such as the stable marriage problem 
(SMP) and stable roommate problem (SRP). 
The motivation of this work is to provide a model based on matching that allows agent preferences and satisfaction to be 
taken into consideration, rather than unifying qualitatively different objectives into a single objective function for 
computation. Another motivation of this work is to give diverse options which may not be optimal but are stable from a 
certain viewpoint. We consider the problem of agent evacuation to demonstrate the power and limitations of our matching 
model. 
The requirements for resilient systems share common problems with the requirements for the Green system and 
sustainable systems: the systems must give diverse solutions each of which has a characteristic unique from others and 
which allows selfish agents to choose their own needs, thus giving a spatio-temporal distribution. To this end, the system 
must be captured as a whole including the users and the environment, and must be designed not only from the single 
viewpoint of economic efficiency but also from the viewpoint of agents. 
For resilient systems, modularity in building blocks is important for the system side, and quantization is also important 
for the problem side. With the modularity in the system side and quantization for problem solving, building resilient systems 
is a design problem (mechanism design) similarly to building the Green system and sustainable systems. 
This paper proposes a design for attaining resilient systems based on a matching model. Conventional designs are mostly 
based on optimization that requires much quantitative information (such as parameters, initial values, and structure) which 
are not available or must be revised greatly in a disaster situation. The resilient systems yielded by the matching model 
provide stable solutions in an autonomous manner whenever the situation changes. The design incorporates network 
rewiring by a matching automaton.8  
Section 2 briefly outlines the agent evacuation problem. Section 3 defines the matching automaton based on matching 
problems such as the stable marriage problem and the roommate problem. Section 4 presents results on the diversification of 
stable matchings introducing symmetry and asymmetry in the stable marriage problem. Section 5 discusses a possible 
application of the stable marriage problem to evacuation route assignment with an example. Section 6 presents the results. 
2. Game Theoretic Approach and Matching Problems 
Simon introduced bounded rationality considering the practical limit of optimization at the agent level. We introduce 
another practicality: agents are not only selfish but they are selfish in diverse ways. Nash introduced an equilibrium at the 
agent (player) level.  
Aiming at resilient systems, we propose using a matching model in designing the defense in advance. The matching 
model, with an appropriate distribution and quantization, allows us to design many stable matchings, so the current solution 
will be replaced by another stable matching by the selfish act of each agent. The design provides multiple diverse stable 
solutions from the viewpoint of each agent or a set of agents (e.g., woman-optimal solution, hence man-pessimal solution). 
The matching model has two main differences from the optimization model: 
 
z The matching model can include the satisfaction of agents by specifying the preference of each agent where 
satisfaction cannot be measured and stability is the measure to be sought and improved for matchings. 
z While the optimal solution is restricted to one unique solution, stable matchings can provide many multiple 
(unimprovable) solutions for different situations and standpoints.  
 
Example 1. 
Motivated by Pigou’s paradox and Braess’s paradox10, this example investigates the saying “Tsunami Tendenko”, 
meaning that everyone should escape from a tsunami on their own. Focusing on evacuation, we simplify the problem of 
evacuation by using only two routes (similarly to Pigou’s paradox): r1 and r2 and two evacuees (agents) a1 and a2. As 
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shown in Table 1 (a), when agent a alone uses route r1 (r2), it will take 1 (2) unit of time, for route r2 is a detour. When 
agent a2 alone uses route r1 (r2), however, it will take 2 (4) units of time, for agent a2 is slower than agent a1. As shown in 
Table 1 (b), when both agents a1 and a2 use route r1 it will take 3 units of time for both agents due to congestion. However, 
when both agents a1 and a2 use route r2 it will take 2 units of time for agent a1 and 4 for agent a2, for the route is broad 
enough for each agent to evacuate independently.  
Suppose agent a1 chooses route r1 with probability p1, hence route r2 with probability 1-p1. Likewise, agent a2 chooses 
route r1 with probability p2, hence route r2 with probability 1-p2. Table 2 summarizes the expected time for both agents to 
complete evacuation, and the expected time for only one (faster) agent to complete evacuation in many situations.  
 
Table 1. Unit of time taken for each agent 
                 (a) When two agents a1 and a2 use distinct routes r1 and r2; (b) When two agents a1 and a2 use the same route.  
  
(a)                                                  (b) 
 r1 r2   r1 r2 
a1 1 2  a1 3 2 
a2 2 4  a2 3 4 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of expected evacuation completion time for different situations 
(a) Equal choice 
 Expected 
evacuation  
completion 
time 
Equal 
choice 
(p1 = p2 
 = p) 
No 
knowledge 
(p1 = p2 = 
1/2) 
Fully 
selfish 
(p1 = p2 = 
1) 
For two 
agents 
p2(p1 − 2) + 
4 
(1 − p)2 
+ 3 
(1/2)2 + 3 3 
For one 
agent 
p1(2p2 − 1) + 
2 
p(2p − 1) 
+ 2 
2 3 
 
(b) Unequal choice 
 Expected 
evacuation  
completion 
time 
More selfish 
(p1 = p + d; 
p2 = p) 
 
Complementary 
(p1 = p; 
p2 = 1 − p) 
Organized 
(p1 = 0;   
p2 = 1) 
Unkind 
(p1 = 1; 
p2 = 0) 
For two 
agents 
p2(p1 − 2) + 
4 
(1 − p)2 + pd 
+ 3 
p(3 − p) 
+ 2 
2 4 
For one 
agent 
p1(2p2 − 1) + 
2 
(p + d)(2p − 
1) + 2 
p(1 − 2p)  
+ 2 
2 1 
 
The best situation among the cases in Table 2 is the Organized case if there were a mechanism by which a government 
assigns the agents to the routes: a1Ær2; a2Ær1. As is known from the More Selfish case, the smaller the probability (d < 0) 
that agent a1 chooses route r1, the shorter the expected evacuation completion time both for two agents (when p > 0) and 
for one agent (when p > 1/2). In an urgent case such as a tsunami, we assume that agents will choose the Equal Choice case. 
If the agents have knowledge that route r1 is shorter than r2, then the Fully Selfish case will be the baseline. If they do not, 
the No Knowledge case will make the expected evacuation completion time for two agents longer (when p < 1) and that for 
one agent shorter (when 0 < p < 1/2) compared with the Fully Selfish case. 
The above example suggests that the evacuation problem is the problem of assigning agents to routes. In some cases, it 
will be a matching problem between agents and routes. The matching problem should reflect not only the agents’ 
preferences for routes but also congestion expected on the routes (i.e. greater congestion for narrower and shorter routes). 
We noted that optimization requires a lot of accurate information which is not available in a disaster situation. However, 
if complete information is available, is such information always favorable for the agents? In the above example, the 
expected evacuation completion time for one agent in the case of No Knowledge (2) is less than that of the Fully Selfish case 
(3). Also, if only agent a1 knows that route r1 is shorter than route r2 and dupes agent a2 into choosing route r2, then the 
Unkind case could happen, which results in a longer expected evacuation completion time for both agents. 
Even worse, the knowledge could hamper both agents if the knowledge is logically entangled. Suppose agent a1 knows 
that “if a1 chooses r2 then agent a2 will choose r1”, but a1 will choose r1 if a1 knows that a2 also has this knowledge. 
Likewise, agent a2 knows that “if a2 chooses r1 then agent a1 will choose r2’, but a2 will choose r2 if a2 knows that a1 
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also has this knowledge. It might happen that the more they know, the deeper their decisions become entangled. Thus, the 
knowledge could make the two agents become deadlocked and unable to choose a route. 
3. Matching Automaton 
3.1. Stable marriage problem as a prototype of matching automaton 
This section introduces a matching automaton by presenting a naïve matching problem: the stable roommates problem 
(SRP).7 SRP assumes 2N participants, each of whom has a strict (without tie) ordered preference over the other 2N − 1 
participants. The SRP seeks complete matching consisting of N pairs without being blocked. A matching is said to be 
blocked if participant A prefers participant C to current roommate B in the matching, and preferred participant C also prefers 
participant A to current roommate D in the matching. The pair A-C is called a blocking pair to the matching.  
The stable marriage problem (SMP)5,6,9 assumes N women and N men, each of whom has a strict (without tie) ordered 
preference over the opposite sex. In a framework allowing the unmarried state, each person has a strict order of preference 
for members of the opposite sex and oneself.9 As in the next Example 2, man m2 has a ranking (w1, w2), which means that 
m2 likes w1 best, and prefers w1 to w2.  
The SMP seeks complete matching which satisfies stability. Stability requires the concept of blocking pairs. Two pairs 
(mi, wp) and (mj, wq) are blocked by the pair (mi, wq) if mi prefers wq to wp and wq prefers mi to mj. A complete matching 
without being blocked is called stable matching. 
 
Example 2. 
As an illustration, let us explain the simplest matching automaton of a switching gate8. The gate consists of two by two 
agents (SMP with size 2) and each agent in a set has a distinct preference to avoid symmetry; furthermore, each pair of 
agents has no first rank assignment (no mutual infatuation) to avoid fixation of the pair in matching. These restrictions lead 
to the following preference structure (expressed by a ranking matrix {rij} where element rij in the ith row and jth column is 
defined to be wjmiR , / miwjR ,  and wjmiR ,  to be a rank of mi to wj):  
൬ʹȀͳ ͳȀʹͳȀʹ ʹȀͳ൰. 
3.2. Matching model as a nondeterministic automaton 
This section explores the matching model as a nondeterministic automaton, which is thus called a matching automaton 
(MA), by contrasting it with the cellular automaton (CA). Both CA and MA are dynamical models that have a structure and 
updating rules, and the initial state should be assigned similarly to the dynamical model described by differential equations.  
The structure of both CA and MA may be specified by a network (or a graph) with a set of nodes and a set of edges 
connecting two nodes. The network describing the structure of CA is usually a regular graph equivalent to a lattice such as a 
square lattice, while that for MA is usually a complete bipartite graph.  
A marked difference between CA and MA is the state. In CA, state is specified for nodes (or cells), while in MA state is 
specified for edges: active and inactive edges. Since the state will change dynamically and only active edges are considered 
to exist, the structure of MA changes dynamically, whereas the structure of CA remains unchanged.  
 
Definition 1. The Discrete Dynamical Model is a triplet (U, T, R) including a graph indicating a structure or a topology 
connecting nodes U by a set of edges T, and R is a set of rules of the interaction. The nodes interact with each other 
according to the interaction rules. 
 
Definition 2. The Cellular Automaton (CA) is a discrete dynamical model specified as a triplet (U, T, R) where U and T 
form a regular graph Gr connecting nodes (corresponding to automata). Each node i has a state ai where the next state will 
be determined by the current states of adjacent nodes (connected by an edge). Thus, rule R is specified as:  
ai (t + 1) = f(an(i) (t))  
Definition 3. The Matching Automaton (MA) is a discrete dynamical model specified as a triplet (U, T, R) where U and 
T form a complete bipartite graph Gb whose edges are connecting two sets of nodes (corresponding to agents). Each node i 
has a preference P over U. Each edge j has a binary state sj: active and inactive where only the active state is considered to 
exist. Among edges (j i) Ѱ7 adjacent to node i, only one edge will be chosen to be active. Among active edges, only stable 
edges are allowed to remain active. Thus, rule R is specified as:  
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sj (t + 1) = F({s j(t): j = (i1i2) Ѱ7;i1, i2ѰU}, P), 
where F is a nondeterministic assignment and stability is determined by preference U. 
The matching automaton has preferences as inputs and outputs the stable matchings. The transition to stable matching 
may not be one-shot. During the transition from unstable to stable matching, the automaton receives other tentative pairings 
as inputs and exchanges the partner when a blocking pair is found. The dynamics may be described by the two 
complementary equations of matching.1  
 
Table 3. Comparison of cellular automaton and matching automaton 
 Cellular automaton Matching automaton 
Structure Graph describing 
structure 
Regular graph Bipartite graph 
Structure Fixed Changing 
Dynamics State Nodes have a state. Edges have a state. 
Rule The next state is determined by the 
states of adjacent nodes. 
Only one edge among 
adjacent edges can exist 
(can be active). 
The active edges remain 
active only when stable. 
 Dynamics The state changes based on the rules 
common to all the nodes. 
Stability is based on the 
preference of each node to 
all the nodes of other parts.  
 
Example 3. 
Let us consider the 2 × 2 SMP in Example 2. With this preference as input, the behavior of the matching automaton is 
grasped by the matching network. Note that only two matchings exist and both of them are stable. Figure 1 shows the two 
matching networks for the two stable matchings. When the automaton seeks the women-optimal solution, then the matching 
will be the one on the upper left. On the other hand, if the automaton seeks the men-optimal solution, the matching will 
switch to the one on the lower right. Thus, this gate is a switching gate with the control input, which reminds us of Fredkin’s 
gate4 which switches the input when the control C is on (women-optimal) and does not switch when C is off (men-optimal).  
Since MA is an automaton, the state transition diagram can be drawn. Figure 1 shows a state transition diagram drawn in 
the affinity space (called affinity space diagram). The affinity space diagram is similar to a phase space diagram which is 
often drawn for a continuous dynamical model. Affinity is used to measure the happiness of a person in a pair. A(mi, wj) is 
man mi’s affinity for woman wj, and A(wj, mi) is woman wj’s affinity for man mi. Let wjmiR , denote man mi’s rank of woman 
wj. Affinity is defined by the rank as: A(mi, wj) = N + 1 − wjmiR , , varying from N to 1 as the rank changes from 1 to N. The 
following total happiness for women and men is used to arrange all the possible matchings ȣ in two-dimensional 
coordinates: ¦

 
P
P
),(
),()(
ij mw
ijw mwAP , ¦

 
P
P
),(
),()(
ij mw
jim wmAP  
Figure 1 is the affinity space diagram of the SMP instance of the above ranking matrix8. Each node represents a matching 
where a stable matching (red square node) corresponds to a stable equilibrium point (or an attractor) and unstable 
matchings (blue circle nodes) correspond to transient states. Matchings are also shown for the stable matching node as 
bipartite graphs in balloons. If the initial matching is transient, it will proceed to the stable matching as the partner-exchange 
proceeds from the initial matching.  
 
  
mP
wP
 
 
ڦ stable  
ƽ unstable 
Fig. 1. An example of a switching gate realized by the matching automaton of 2 × 2 agents. Two 
squares indicate stable matchings. The matchings will be switched among one another by changing the 
mode of the automaton, i.e., women-optimal or men-optimal.  
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4. Symmetry and Asymmetry in Stable Marriage Problems 
4.1. Symmetry and decomposition 
Symmetry is defined by operations on the target objects and indistinguishability. To discuss symmetry in the SMP, we 
need to set a unit for the components of the SMP. For example, when we set the unit as the individual, and men mi and mj 
are indistinguishable from each other after the operations, then mi and mj are symmetrical with the operations. After the 
symmetry is defined by the operations, then we can use the principle of symmetry: if the problem exhibits a certain 
symmetry, then the solution of the problem also has the symmetry. In the SMP, when mi and mj are indistinguishable from a 
viewpoint, then they should be indistinguishable from the viewpoint in the stable matchings. In this case, the operation is the 
changing of identity from mi to mj or vice versa.  
Although indistinguishability is binary, if we can introduce a measure indicating proximity to the indistinguishable 
objects then we can use the heuristic: when the problem can involve a measure indicating the distance, then the solution 
may have a measure that preserves the distance, that is, when two entities are close in the problem, they are also close in the 
solutions. 
Let us look at several examples of indistinguishability when changing the unit from the individual level to a set of 
individual levels including the entire persons in the SMP. 
Let ²k(mi)denote the kth preferred woman of man mi. Let <k(mi)be a mapping from man mi to an ordered set starting 
with the first preferred woman ²1(mi) up to his kth preferred women ²k(mi): {²1(mi), ²2(mi), …, ²k(mi)}, and call it mi’s 
kth active characterizing ordered set.  
 
Theorem 1. 
If all the men are indistinguishable by the active characterizing ordered set, then the SMP can be sequentially 
decomposed into N pairs, hence the SMP has a unique stable matching. 
Proof 
If the active characterizing ordered set for all men mi is equal, men cannot be distinguished by the active characterizing 
ordered set. Then the SMP can be sequentially decomposed into N pairs. Because all the men first prefer one woman ²1(mi) 
to other women, and that woman first prefers a man ²1(²1(mi)), the pair ²1(²1(mi)) and ²1(mi) mutually prefers first to 
other persons, and the pair is included by any stable matching, thus we can remove the pair from the SMP without affecting 
the stable matchings of the original SMP. For the rest of the size N − 1 SMP, we can do the same. Thus, by induction, the 
original SMP is sequentially decomposed into N pairs, and the stable matching of the original SMP is the direct product of 
the set of stable matchings of each decomposed component. Thus, when the active characterizing ordered set of men is 
degenerated, then the solution is also degenerated into unique stable matching. 
 
This is an extreme case where the stable matching is degenerated to one matching. Another extreme case is when the 
active characterizing ordered set for any two men is distinct. That is, <N(mi) ӆ<N(mj) for any two distinct men miӆmj. One 
can find such cases in the Latin SMP as described in the next subsection. 
Two individuals of the same sex, say mi and mj, can be indistinguishable by the kth active characterizing ordered set; let 
us call two men mi and mj k-indistinguishable. Since this k-indistinguishability is the equivalence relation, k-
indistinguishability allows the decomposition of the set of men M into the equivalence class of the k-indistinguishability. 
For two distinct integers k1 and k2 (k1 < k2 < N), mi and mj can be k2-distinguishable even if they are k1-
indistinguishable. Thus, the equivalence class by the k2-indistinguishability can be a further partition of the equivalence 
class by the k1-indistinguishability. In considering the sensitivity of k in k-indistinguishability, is it possible to neglect the 
information of kth preference for large k (close to N − 1)? As integer k is increased starting from 1, one can find the threshold 
of kc such that for any k exceeding kc (k > kc), the individuals of the same equivalence class defined by the k-
indistinguishability can be exchanged without affecting the solution (stable matchings), and so we can neglect information 
of the kth preference exceeding kc in solving the SMP. 
When the unit is set to the set of individuals of the same sex, the two sets M = {m1, m2, …, mN} and W = {w1, w2, …, wN} 
can be indistinguishable if the ranking matrix from men M to women W and that from women W to men M are 
indistinguishable. In that case, it is not possible to distinguish the original SMP from the one after all the men and women 
are exchanged. 
In order to solve the problem, the problem should generally be operated in a sequential fashion, which is one directional 
and asymmetric (as opposed to both directional as symmetric). Thus, we need to introduce asymmetry in the algorithm and 
the asymmetry may be preserved in the solution. In the case of the SMP, the Gale-Sharpley algorithm requires the proposing 
side to be set, and the resulting solution is optimal for that side.  
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If the man-optimal solutions are decomposed, then we can decompose the original problem into multiple non-
decomposable components restricted to men (called “man-decomposition”), if we are interested only in the man-optimal 
solutions. 
 
4.2. Symmetry in Latin SMP 
The Latin SMP2,3 describes a strange world where the more one person likes another person, then the more that other 
person dislikes the person. The SMP in Example 2 is the Latin SMP. 
Let wjmiR ,  denote a rank of mi to wj and kR wjmi  ,  if mi’s kth preferred woman is wj. The Latin SMP is defined by the 
ranking matrix: {rij} = { wjmiR , / miwjR , } such that wjmiR , + miwjR ,  = N + 1 for all mi Ѱ M and wj Ѱ W. The Latin SMP 
exhibits symmetry and the stable matchings of the Latin SMP also exhibit symmetry. The Latin SMP can be built by using 
the shift operator SR(wi1, wi2, …, wiN) = (wiN, wi1, wi2, …, wiN-1).  
 
Theorem 2. 
In the Latin SMP, the matching consisting of only the pairs of man mi and his kth preferred woman ²k(mi): {(mi, ²k(mi)} 
i = 1…N is stable matching.  
Proof 
Suppose in the matching {(mi, ²k(mi))} i = 1…N, the two pairs (mi, ²k(mi)) and (mj, ²k(mj)) are blocked by the 
blocking pair (mi, wj). Then wj = ²k’(mi) for k’ < k by the definition of the blocking pair, and mi = ²Nÿÿ(wj) for k’’ < N + 
1−k. Then k’ + k’’ < N + 1 which contradicts the definition of the Latin SMP that requires k’ + k’’ = N + 1.  
 
This Theorem 2 implies that the number of stable matchings in the Latin SMP is not less than the size N of the Latin 
SMP. 
 
Theorem 3. 
In the Latin SMP, if the matching consists of such pairs {pl} that for any two pairs pi = (mi, ²k1(mi)) and pj = (mj, ²
k2(mj)) in {pl} k2 = k1 + 1, then the matching consisting of the pairs {pl} l = 1…N is stable matching.  
Proof 
Suppose two pairs pi = (mi, ²k1(mi)) and pj = (mj, ²k2(mj)) from the matching have a blocking pair (mi,²k2(mj)) where k1 
= k2 + 1 without loss of generality. When we rewrite (mi,²k2(mj)) as (mi, ²k3(mi)) then k3 < k1 by the definition of the 
blocking pair. We can also rewrite (mi,²k2(mj)) as (²k4(²k2(mj)),²k2(mj)) and also rewrite (mj, ²k2(mj)) as (²k5(²k2(mj)),
²k2(mj)), and so k4 < k5 by the definition of the blocking pair. Together with k3 + k4 = N + 1 and k2 + k5 = N + 1 by the 
definition of the Latin SMP, it is implied that k2 < k3 < k1, which contradicts k1 = k2 + 1. Thus, there is no blocking pair 
for the matching. 
 
Theorem 4. 
In the Latin SMP, the stable matching is stable after all the men’s ranking wjmiR , and women’s ranking miwjR , are 
exchanged.  
Proof 
The Latin SMP has the symmetry that the above operations result in men being re-labeled as women and women being re-
labeled as men. 
 
Anti-SMP is defined in the imaginary world where each person tries to mate with less-liked persons. How would the 
solutions of the original SMP change in this imaginary world? When the unit is set to the entire persons in the SMP, that is, 
men M and women W, the SMP is indistinguishable from its anti-SMP if the ranking matrix with completely opposite 
preference is indistinguishable from the original ranking matrix. The Latin SMP has such symmetry. Anti-SMP is defined 
for the SMP. That is, the anti-SMP can be obtained by making the preferences completely the opposite order from that in 
the original SMP. To understand the anti-SMP, let us imagine the anti-world where individuals seek individuals with whom 
they least wish to mate, then the stable matching in the anti-world is the solution of the anti-SMP.  
The pseudo-Latin SMP is defined to have a ranking matrix whose elements {rij} = { wjmiR , / miwjR , } no longer range from 
1 to N, and the sum wjmiR , + miwjR , is no longer N + 1, although the elements must be distinct.
3 For distinct men mi and ml, it 
is possible that wjmlwjmi RR ,,   and likewise for two distinct women. Example 3 presents a pseudo-Latin SMP. 
1479 Yoshiteru Ishida and Shizuka Hashimoto /  Procedia Computer Science  60 ( 2015 )  1472 – 1481 
5. Matching Oriented Design  
5.1. Matching and optimization 
Matching based design allows a system builder to prepare several options, which are rational when a viewpoint is fixed, 
for a decision maker (including agents involved in the matching) to select. Matching based design and optimization based 
systems may be captured as a granularity setting for quantization. Optimization based systems require quantitative 
information, while matching based design requires qualitative information of preference. A marked difference is that the 
matching based design includes agent preferences, which are difficult to quantify but may be compared within agents, while 
optimization based systems assume that any factors can be quantified. When quantified, similar computations may be done 
with the optimization paradigm using multi-objective optimization, however, factors such as agent preference and 
satisfaction are not suitable for quantification. Table 4 compares the matching paradigm with the optimization paradigm. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of optimization paradigm and matching paradigm 
 
Optimization paradigm Matching paradigm 
Many objectives are mapped 
to a single objective function 
Many objectives are used 
to prepare diverse but 
stable solutions 
Requires much information 
such as parameters 
Requires preferences from 
each agent 
Viewpoint from outside of the 
system 
Viewpoint from agents 
within the system 
If the optimized solution is 
not available, then the 
second-best solution will be 
used (with the common 
objective function) 
If one stable solution is not 
available, then other stable 
solutions will be used 
(with the value of other 
agents) 
Efficiency Resilience 
5.2. An example of evacuation route assignment 
Example 3. 
As illustrative examples, let us consider evacuation route assignment from multiple starting points to a target point (a 
shelter) assuming we can set relay points with the same number of starting points. Figure 2 shows an example of such routes 
where the distances between the starting points to the relay points are shown in Table 5 (a). The distances from the relay 
points to the target point are assumed to be equal.  
Table 5. (a) Distances between starting points and relay points; (b) Preference based on the distance. 
(a)                                                                       (b) 
 r1 r2 r3 r4   r1 r2 r3 r4 
s1 40 10 15 25  s1 4 1 2 3 
s2 10 25 20 35  s2 1 3 2 4 
s3 15 30 25 40  s3 1 3 2 4 
s4 30 40 27 10  s4 3 4 2 1 
 
Table 6. (a) Preference ordered inversely proportional to the distance; (b) Preference based on the width. 
(a)                                                                        (b) 
 s1 s2 s3 s4   s1 s2 s3 s4 
r1 1 4 3 2  r1 4 2 3 1 
r2 4 3 2 1  r2 3 4 1 2 
r3 4 3 2 1  r3 1 3 4 2 
r4 3 2 1 4  r4 1 2 4 3 
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This problem can be mapped to a matching problem of the SMP between two sets: starting points and relay points. A 
preference (Table 5 (b)) from starting points to relay points can be set in a straightforward manner based on the distance 
between them (Table 5 (a)). For the preference from relay points to starting points, however, there is a degree of freedom, 
and we can use the freedom for different situations. Again, for simplicity, two extremes can be considered: one based on the 
width of the road (Table 6 (b)), and the other in inverse proportion to the distance (exactly the reversed order of the former 
one) (Table 6 (a)). Generally, the preference proportional to distance may be related to the shortest path concern (of 
evacuees), and the preference inversely proportional to distance may be related to the congestion concern (of local 
government). It should be noted, however, that a measure inversely proportional to distance is just a simple substitute for a 
congestion measure, and more realistic and exact measures such as road width, road slope, and road type should be used if 
available.  
 
  
 
 
 
s 
 㻌
Fig. 3. (b) State transition diagram. 
Total distance for matchings from left to right 132; 92; 55 
  132; 92; 65㻌
Fig. 3. (c) State transition diagram. 
Total distance for matchings from left to right 110; 
65; 55 
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Fig. 2. An example of SMP instance specified by ordered distance from start points to 
relay points (left) and that from relay points to start points (right). The distance from a 
start point to a relay point is assumed to be equal to that from the relay point to the start 
point. The bipartite graph shows a matching of SMP consisting of four pairs. 㻌
Order by 
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Order by 
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Fig. 3. (a) State transition diagram. 
Total distance for matchings from left to right 87; 65; 55 
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Figure 3 shows state transition diagrams of the matching automaton where the red square node indicates the stable 
matching and the blue circle node indicates unstable matchings. Matchings are also shown as bipartite graphs in balloons. 
One transition indicated by an edge is done by exchanging partners between two pairs in the matching. The preference from 
starting points to relay points is ordered by the distance between them. However, the preference from relay points to starting 
points is ordered by distance (a), by inverse proportion to distance (b), and by width of road (c). The horizontal axis 
indicates the affinity from starting points to relay points which are based on the distance (the shorter, the greater the 
affinity). The horizontal axis is the same for the three examples, whereas the vertical axis indicates the affinity from relay 
points to starting points and differs among the three examples. 
When the distance is used to rank both from starting points to relay points (Table 5 (b)) and from the relay points to 
starting points, the state transition diagram (Fig. 3 (a)) gives unique stable matchings {(s1, r2), (s2, r1), (s3, r3), (s4, r4)}, for 
which the total distance (55) is minimum among the possible routes. However, if all the agents select this matching, it 
would create congestion on this single solution.  
Assuming that congestion occurs in inverse proportion to the distance, and if we use this information to rank from the 
relay points to the starting points (Table 6 (a)), then the state transition diagram (Fig. 3 (b)) gives three stable matchings 
focusing on distance {(s1, r2), (s2, r3), (s3, r1), (s4, r4)} (total distance = 65), congestion {(s1, r1), (s2, r4), (s3, r2), (s4, r3)} 
(total distance = 132) and intermediate {(s1, r4), (s2, r2), (s3, r1), (s4, r3)} (total distance = 92). Agents can choose among 
these three options based on their preference. This is the case where the SMP becomes the pseudo-Latin SMP3. 
By using road width in the ranking from the relay points to the starting points (Table 6 (b)), we can get three solutions 
which are more practical. 
6. Conclusions 
The matching automaton based on the stable marriage problem was introduced. We demonstrated that the matching 
automaton can deal with agent satisfaction involving the concept of stable matching. When the granularity and quantization 
are appropriate, the matching automaton can create diverse solutions each of which is stable from a certain viewpoint. The 
agent evacuation problem was solved by the matching automaton using the example of assigning agents to routes, and 
assigning evacuation paths from starting points to relay points. 
We pointed out that optimization requires much information which may not be available in a disaster situation, although 
matching allows us to prepare several stable solutions based on qualitative information such as preferences of agents. 
However, we also raised the question that if complete information is available, then is such information always favorable for 
the agents?  
Although we focused on the evacuation route assignment problem to compare the matching oriented design and 
optimization based solution, the matching model may be applied to broad areas where resilience is required.  
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